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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Bruce Reed was convicted of enticing of children over the internet and the district court 
imposed a unified sentence of eleven years, with two years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Reed asserts 
that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Reed 
was using the internet to "solicit, lure, or persuade" a minor child under sixteen to engage in 
sexual acts. Additionally, Mr. Reed contends that the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing an excessive sentence in light of the mitigating factors present in this case. 
Statement of the Facts 
On September 29, 2009, "bsubearsguitar" initiated an online chat with "borahjenny" in a 
romance by location Yahoo chat room. (Tr., p.166, L.8 - p.167, L.20, p.173, L.5 p.174, L.8.) 
Yahoo makes it clear that no one under the age of eighteen should be participating in an online 
conversation in the romance chat rooms. (Tr., p.307, L.24 p.308, L.12.) "Bsubearsguitar" 
identified himself as a twenty-five year old male from Boise while "borahjenny" identified 
herself as a fifteen year old female from Boise. (9/29/09 Chat, p.1.)1 In reality, "borahjenny" 
was a middle aged male police detective named Kenneth Smith and Mr. Reed acknowledged that 
he was chatting as "bsubearsguitar." (Tr., p.157, Ls.17-20, p.172, Ls.1-3, p.484, Ls.1-23.) Over 
the next five months in which the online chats were occurring, Mr. Reed did not attempt to 
personally meet with "borahjenny," despite Detective Smith's attempts, on numerous occasions, 
1 Each of the chats is separated by date, which is identified at the top of each page. All of the chats are included in 
State's Exhibit 2 and are separately numbered. For ease of reference, the documents contained in Exhibit 2 will be 
cited in accordance with the date in which they occur and page numbers contained therein: For example, the chat 




to facilitate a meeting with Mr. Reed. (See 11125/09 Chat, p.1; 111211 0 Chat, pp.1-2, 1125/10 
Chat, pp.2-3.) 
In fact, when Detective Smith asked Mr. Reed for his telephone number and address, 
Mr. Reed refused to provide it. (Tr., p.358, L.24 - p.259, L.4 (Mr. Reed declining to give his 
address and telephone number to "borahjenny"), p.382, Ls.11-16 (Mr. Reed declining to give his 
telephone number to "borahjenny").) Moreover, on a number of different occasions throughout 
the five months, Mr. Smith questioned "borahjenny" as to whether she was with law 
enforcement. (Chat 11/23/09, pp.2-3 (Mr. Reed asking "borahjenny" if she is associated with the 
law and asking "borahjenny to unlock "her" Myspace account so Mr. Reed can see "her"), 
1120110 Chat, p.2 (Mr. Reed suspecting "borahjenny" is law enforcement).) In fact, even 
Detective Reed believed that Mr. Reed was "undecided" as to whether "borahjenny" was with 
lawenforcement. (Tr., p.389, Ls.7-22.) 
Ultimately law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant for Mr. Reed's residence 
and executed the search warrant on February 23, 2010. (Tr., p.301, L.13 p.302, L.10.) 
Mr. Reed was charged by Information with enticing of children over the internet. (R., pp.30-31.) 
Mr. Reed proceeded to trial and was convicted of enticing of children over the internet. 
(R., pp.83-100, 117.) Defense counsel then filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, arguing 
that the trial evidence was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. (R., pp.122, 131-136.) 
Following a hearing on the motion, the district court denied Mr. Reeds Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal. (R., p.159; 11112110 Tr., p.4, L.4 p.32, L.25.) At sentencing the State asked the 
district court to impose the statutory maximum aggregate sentence of fifteen years. (4/20111 Tr., 
p.16, Ls.3-1 0.) Defense counsel for Mr. Reed sought a unified sentence of eight years, with one 
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year fixed. (4/20111 Tr., p.25, Ls.20-25.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of eleven 
years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Reed. (R., pp.l89-191.) Mr. Reed filed apro se Notice of 




1. Was there sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Reed was 
using the internet to "solicit, lure, or persuade" a minor child under sixteen to engage in 
sexual acts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an aggregate sentence of 






There Was Insufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Mr. Reed Was 
Using The Internet To "Solicit, Lure, Or Persuade" A Minor Child Under Sixteen To Engage In 
Sexual Acts 
A. Introduction 
Between September 29, 2009 and February 10, 2010 Mr. Reed chatted with 
"borahjenny", a middle aged police detective with Ada County, approximately 32 times. While 
the chats contained gratuitous language and adult oriented subject matter, Mr. Reed did not 
attempt to personally meet "borahjenny" or provide the detective with any of his contact 
information to facilitate a meeting. Rather, it appears as though Mr. Reed was skeptical from the 
very beginning as to "borahjenny's" true identity and more interested in engaging in "fantasy 
chat" with another unidentified individual in an adult only chat room. As such, the State failed 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Reed was using the internet to "solicit, seduce, lure, 
or persuade" a minor child under sixteen to engage in sexual acts. 
B. There Was Insufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Mr. Reed 
Was Using The Internet To "Solicit, Lure, Or Persuade" A Minor Child Under Sixteen 
To Engage In Sexual Acts 
Mr. Reed asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict him enticing of children 
over the internet. Specifically, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Mr. Reed was using the internet to "solicit, lure, or persuade" a minor child under sixteen to 
engage in sexual acts and there was not sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Reed believed 
"borahjenny" was a minor child. 
5 
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An accused's right to demand proof of the State's case beyond a reasonable doubt is of 
"surpassing importance." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000). The right to 
demand proof beyond all reasonable doubt is a bedrock constitutional principle. See In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ("Although virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt 
standard in common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it is as a requirement of 
due process, such adherence does 'reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law 
should be enforced and justice administered.'" (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 
(1968)). "Simply stated, the fact that defendant is 'probably' guilty does not equate with guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Ehlert, 811 N.E.2d 620,631 (Ill. 2004). 
In State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592 (et. App. 1997), it was stated that: 
[a]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A 
judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned on 
appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact 
could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential 
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt . . . [w]e will not substitute our 
view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be 
given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence ... [m]oreover, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution. 
Id. at 594-595 (citations omitted). 
In State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134 (et. App. 1997), it was noted that, "[ e ]vidence is 
regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining 
whether a disputed point of fact has been proved." Id. at 135. "The challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence is not based on a technical or subtle defect. The defense simply says that there 
was not enough admissible evidence to convict the defendant." State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 
877 (et. App. 1995). 
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Mr. Reed was charged by Information with enticing of children over the internet pursuant 
to I.e. §18-1509A(1), which provides: 
A person aged eighteen (18) years or older shall be guilty of a felony if he or she 
knowingly uses the internet to solicit, seduce, lure, persuade or entice by words or 
actions, or both, a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years or a person the 
defendant believes to be a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years to 
engage in any sexual act with or against the child where such act is a violation of 
chapter 15, 61 or 66, title 18, Idaho Code. 
IDAHO CODE § 18-1509A(1) (2009). The jury was then instructed that in order to find Mr. Reed 
guilty of enticing a child over the internet, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
1. On or between September 29,2009, and February 10,2010; 
2. in the State of Idaho; 
3. the defendant BRUCE E. REED; 
4. being a person aged eighteen (18) years or older; 
5. who knowingly used the internet to solicit, lure, or entice by words or actions, or 
both; 
6. a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years, or a person the defendant 
believed to be a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years; 
7. to engage in a sexual act with or against the child that would constitute Lewd 
Conduct with a Minor Child under Sixteen (16). 
(1.1. No.3.) Mr. Reed asserts the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
"knowingly used the internet to solicit, lure, or entice by words or actions, or both." Idaho Code 
§ 18-1509 A, as it existed at the time of the allegations required something more than just 
chatting online with person in a sexual manner, as evidenced that the changes to the statute 
enacted in 2012 and the case law interpreting the enticing of a child statute. This past legislative 
session, the Idaho Legislature amended I.C. § 18-1509A and added the following section, "(4) In 
7 
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a prosecution under this section, it is not necessary for the prosecution to show an act described 
in chapter 15,61 or 66, title 18, Idaho Code, actually occurred." IDAHO CODE § 18-1509A(4) 
(2012) (emphasis added). "When the legislature changes the language of a statute, it is presumed 
that they intended to change the application or meaning of that statute." Woodvine v. Triangle 
Dairy, Inc., 106 Idaho 716, 721 (1984) (citing Hawkins v. Chandler, 88 Idaho 20 (1964». Thus, 
it is apparent that the former statute, under which Mr. Reed is charged, required the prosecution 
to "show an act" described the relevant criminal statutes "actually occurred;" or something 
substantially more than simple online communication. 
Consistent with the legislative intent behind the 2012 amendment, it appears that 2009 
version, which is applicable to Mr. Reed, has been interpreted to require some act substantially 
more nefarious than chatting in a virtual room. See State v. Glass, 146 Idaho 77 (Ct. App. 2008). 
In Glass, the defendant was charged with enticement of a child over the internet as set forth in 
I.C. § 18-1509A(l). Glass argued that his proposition to "masturbate in front ofa child is not in 
contravention of I.C. § 18-1509A(1)" because said conduct is not done "with or against" the 
child. Id. 146 Idaho at 83. The Glass Court agreed with Glass, that he could not be in violation 
of the statute "by his proposed masturbation." The Court then went on to analyze "whether there 
was sufficient evidence presented to conclude that Glass sought to seduce or lure 
'lisa200215ncal' to participate in sexual activity in addition to the proposal of masturbation such 
that he was soliciting a violation of code sections identified in I.C. § 18-1509A." Id. at 83-84 
(emphasis in original). In finding that there was sufficient evidence for the conviction the court 
stated: 
1145.0003 
While Glass's proposition to masturbate in front of "lisa200215ncal" alone was 
not sufficient to warrant conviction under the enticement statute, there was 
8 
sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that he was also soliciting further 
acts such that he was in violation of sections implicated in section 18-1509 A, 
namely section 18-1508 which defines lewd conduct with a minor under age 
sixteen. While "letsgetkinky831" only explicitly referred to plans of 
masturbation, the context of the discussion makes it evident that the proposed 
masturbation was but a stem in the process of luring or seducing "lisa200215ncal" 
to direct sexual contact and by showing up at the apartment had taken a 
substantial step toward this end. 
Id. at 85 (emphasis added). Thus, in order to obtain a conviction under the charged statute it is 
clear that a suspect must not only engage in sexually oriented online chat with a minor child 
under sixteen or a person the suspect believes to be a minor child under sixteen but must also 
take a substantial step toward the sexual contact, such as showing up at the apartment. 
The conduct in the instant case does not rise to the actual requirements of the statute. 
Throughout the five month period, Mr. Reed refused to provide his telephone or cell phone 
number and refused to give his actual location to "borahjenny." (See 11130109 Chat, pp.1-2, Tr., 
p.358, L.24 p.259, L.4 (Mr. Reed declining to give his address and telephone number to 
"borahjenny"), p.382, Ls.11-16 (Mr. Reed declining to give his telephone number to 
"borahjenny").) Moreover, Mr. Reed did not attempt to meet or take any action to meet 
"borahjenny" despite "her" attempts to set up a rendezvous, including providing "her" address to 
Mr. Reed. (See 11125/09 Chat, p.1; 1112/10 Chat, pp.1-2, 1125/10 Chat, pp.2-3.) In fact, the only 
thing Mr. Reed did was engage in an online conversation with a person he suspected was a law 
enforcement officer. (See Chat 11123/09, pp.2-3 (Mr. Reed asking "borahjenny" if she is 
associated with the law and asking "borahjenny to unlock "her" Myspace account so Mr. Reed 
can see "her"); 1120/1 0 Chat, p.2 (Mr. Reed suspecting "borahjenny" is law enforcement); 2/3/1 0 
Chat, pp.1-2 (Mr. Reed stating, "I can't think of anything that would prove ur real ... well I 
9 
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mean not affiliated with the police ... maybe if u had a myspace with a bunch of friends that 
would help") (errors in original).) 
Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Mr. Reed was using the internet to "solicit, lure, or persuade" a minor child under 
sixteen to engage in sexual acts and as a result, Mr. Reeds conviction should be vacated. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Aggregate Sentence Of Eleven 
Years, Upon Mr. Reed Following His Conviction For Enticing Children Over The Internet, In 
Light Of The Mitigating Factors Present In His Case 
Mr. Reed asserts that, given any view of the facts, his aggregate sentence of eleven years 
is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving 
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the 
public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '" [w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an 
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing 
the sentence. '" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Reed does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. 
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Reed must show that in light of the 
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. !d. (citing State 
v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 
Idaho 385 (1992)). The governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) 
10 
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protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility 
of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe, 
99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coass%, 136 Idaho 138 
(2001». 
Mr. Reed asserts that when reviewing the governing criteria in light of the facts and 
circumstances of this case, his aggregate sentence of eleven years is unduly harsh. The first 
objective a court is to review is protection of society. The instant case does not involve touching 
for physical contact with a minor victim. Rather, involved admittedly inappropriate conversation 
over the internet with a ground male adult that portrayed himself as a fifteen year old female 
high school student. Moreover, unlike the "typical enticement case" where a suspect is caught 
attempting to meet the mysterious minor, Mr. Reed was given multiple opportunities to meet 
"borahjenny" and affirmatively refused to do so. (See Tr., p.279, L.23 - p.280, L.7, p.390, L.23 
- p.391, L.12, p.409, L.13 - p.410, L.12.) In fact, Mr. Reed refused to provide "borahjenny" 
with his contact information despite "her" numerous requests. (Tr., p.358, L.24 p.259, LA, 
p.382, Ls.11-16.) Thus, even if Mr. Reed had been talking to a minor, she would have been 
unable to contact him or go to his residence because the minor would not have had his physical 
address or telephone number. As such, society is appropriately protected in this case not with a 
long aggregate sentence, but rather by limiting Mr. Reed's access to online communications. 
Deterrence, both specific and general, is also met in this case. With regard to specific 
deterrence, although Mr. Reed certainly has acted "impulsively and irresponsibly," the 
appropriate response is not a long aggregate sentence, but in providing the professional treatment 
necessary to deal with his impulsivity and irresponsibility. Most likely, Mr. Reed's impulsivity 
11 
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and irresponsibility will significantly dissipate as Mr. Reed grows older. Moreover, Mr. Reed 
has strong support from friends and family as evidenced by the large number of individuals 
writing letters to the court in support ofMr. Reed. (PSI, pp.l06-134.) It is these individuals that 
provide Mr. Reed with the support and guidance to continue on his path of once again becoming 
a productive member of society. With regard to general deterrence, Mr. Reed asserts that an 
aggregate eight year term, which is what he is seeking in the instant case, is sufficient to deter 
society from engaging in inappropriate online chats. Additionally, it is important to reiterate that 
Mr. Reed never made himself available or attempted to meet "borahjenny." Likewise, Mr. Reed 
contends that the lengthy pretrial detention, subsequent prison confinement, and length parole is 
sufficient punishment/retribution for his online conversations. 
Finally, Mr. Reed can be adequately rehabilitated. Mr. Reed is a bright young man from 
a supportive and successful family. (See PSI, pp.6-8, 106-108, 115-117.) Mr. Reed's 
impulsivity and irresponsibility can be addressed through professional treatment and will 
naturally continue to dissipate as he ages. It is also important to note that Mr. Reed is not 
addicted to alcohol or drugs, has no significant mental health issues, and the instant offense did 
not involve any physical violence or touching. Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, Mr. Reed 
asserts that the district court erred in imposing a sentence in excessive of eight years. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Reed respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction. Alternatively, he 





DATED this ~ day of June, 2012. 
BRADY LAW, CHARTERED 
By: Eric D. Fredericksen 
Attorney for Bruce E. Reed 
Appellant Defendant 
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